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Fifty Conflict of Laws "Restatements": Merging
Judicial Discretion and Legislative Endorsement
Shirley A. Wiegand*
I. INTRODUCTION
The arcane and complex world inhabited by choice of law
scholars seems light years away from the world inhabited by those
who must resolve real tort, contract, and property disputes.
Practicing lawyers and judges must find real answers to problems
such as these:
1. What is the measure of damages for an automobile
accident in Canada between State X and Canadian
residents when Canadian law precludes the recovery
of non-economic damages?
2. Does State X or State Y contract law apply when a
State X company supplies defective materials for
building construction in State Y?
3. Does State X's safe place statute protect a State X
resident who slips and falls in a State Y motel parking
lot?
4. Is a State X hospital liable for shipping bone marrow
in a defective container, thus forcing a State Y child
to undergo a second bone marrow removal, when
State X law would prohibit recovery?
5. Does State X's law apply to insurance issues when a
State X resident is involved in an accident in State Y?
All of these questions involve choice of law issues, all have arisen in
the courts of just one state in the past decade,1 and all states have
wrestled with similar issues.
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1. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis.
2002) (Canadian auto accident); Edward E. Gillen Co. v. Valders Stone & Marble,
Inc., 468 N.W.2d 32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (stone for breakwater and ramp);
Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (fall in parking
lot); Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997)
(bone marrow container); see, e.g., Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 551 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 576
N.W.2d 88 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); American Family Ins. Co. v. Powell, 486 N.W.2d
537 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Continental Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 54 F. Supp. 2d 874
(E.D. Wis. 1999); Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1250 (7th
Cir. 1997) (insurance issues).
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In one recent year, more than 1,600 choice of law cases were
reported in American state and federal courts.2 All require efficient,
practical, and just resolution. Those issues have become more
difficult since the 1960s when states began to reject traditional
methods of resolving them. For example, since 1965 when one state
rejected traditional choice of law methodology, its courts were called
upon to resolve choice of law issues in at least eighty-five cases.3
No doubt, many more attorneys have settled cases without fully
litigating (or even being aware of) the choice of law issues.
While choice of law scholars discuss, debate, and even argue
about the best way to resolve the issues, judges and attorneys go
about their business. But that business is made more difficult by the
myriad of modern choice of law methodologies that states apply
today.
This article examines current choice of law methodologies and
critiques proposals for new and improved methodologies. It rejects
the call for a national approach and instead proposes that each state
adopt its own statutory choice of law code. The author recommends
that each state begin this process by conducting empirical research
and analysis of its own choice of law jurisprudence to determine how
judges have approached the issue since rejection of traditional
methods. Such analysis would examine not only substantive results,
but also the methodologies employed and the possible existence of
various biases in choice of law analysis. A thorough analysis would
also likely reveal clear patterns for those issues that reappear from
time to time. Drafters of a state choice of law code, rather than
creating a choice of law methodology from whole cloth, would base
their recommendations on the state's own jurisprudence. Such a
result engages the efforts of both the judicial and legislative branches
of the state's government, thereby resulting in a credible written
product that reflects the state's own policies and jurisprudence: a
true "restatement" of the law.
II. MODERN CHOICE OF LAW METHODOLOGIES
Until the 1960s, an American court's choice of law methodology
was fairly predictable. Courts applied a traditional approach
incorporated in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws :4 the law of
the place where the particular right "vested." For tort cases, the right
vested at the place of injury; for contract cases, the place of
2. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003:
Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 9, 10 (2004).
3. See infra text accompanying note 148.
4. Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934).
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contracting; for property disputes, the property's location.' The
1960s witnessed the beginnings of the choice of law revolution that
led to the varied approaches seen today. Those who happily rejected
the traditional approach could not anticipate that courts would be
struggling with "modem" methodologies forty years later. As one
court noted when it rejected the traditional approach in 1965:
[W]e do so in the belief that the rule contemplated by the
[then proposed Restatement (Second) and two prior cases]
will result in a common law of conflicts that will be
administered with uniformity as jurisdictions generally adopt
this rule. To arrive at such uniformity requires an analysis on
a consistent basis so that a similar fact situation will result in
6a similar determination.
That has not happened.
Currently, only ten states follow traditional methodology for tort
and eleven for contract.' Three states follow the "significant
contacts" method for tort and five follow it for contract.8 Twenty-
two states purport to follow the Restatement (Second)9 for tort and
twenty-four for contract.' 0 For tort issues, three states apply "interest
analysis" and three others apply forum law. 1 Five states follow
Leflar' s "better law" methodology for torts and two of them apply it
for contract disputes.' 2 Finally, six states apply a combination of
modem methodologies for torts and ten of them for contracts.
13
Even assuming that the list above accurately describes what
courts actually do-and in fact, it does not (courts routinely combine
methods, apply only a portion of a particular method, arrive at a
conclusion without describing their analysis at all)-the
5. Obviously these rules were not as simple as they sound. The place of the
contract's formation often depended upon whether the contract was unilateral or
bilateral; when the disputed issue involved contract performance, the law of the
place of performance often applied, rather than where the contract was entered.
Traditional rules had a number of exceptions. See Shirley A. Wiegand, Officious
Intermeddling, Interloping Chauvinism, Restatement (Second), and Leflar:
Wisconsin's Choice of Law Melting Pot, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 761, 761-64 (1998).
6. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Wis. 1965).
7. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 26.
8. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000:
As the Century Turns, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 13-15 (2001).
9. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
10. Symeonides, supra note 8, at 13. However, as a number of scholars have
noted, courts often purport to follow Restatement (Second) while in fact applying
only a portion of the methodology or applying an entirely different methodology.
See, e.g., Wiegand, supra note 5, at 788-89, 801-03.





methodologies themselves allow wide areas of discretion. For
example, in a simple torts case, the Restatement (Second), the most
widely accepted choice of law methodology, requires courts to look
first for a presumptive law to apply, then consult at least two other
Restatement sections, both of which consist of multiple "relevant"
factors including "the needs of the interstate and international
systems," "the relevant policies of the forum" and "of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue," "the protection of justified
expectations," and so on. 4 The methodology is not only complex,
but it provides no underlying principle other than applying the law
of the state that has the "most significant relationship" to the issue.
Leflar's "better law" methodology limits the relevant factors to five
(called "choice-influencing considerations"), but the fifth factor
directs the court to determine which of the competing laws is
"better,' ' 5 again permitting broad discretion.
As a result, it has become difficult to predict what a court will do
when faced with choice of law issues, and each case seems to
demand an ad hoc determination. For attorneys, this lack of
predictability may discourage settlement; it certainly inhibits an
accurate case valuation. For judges, choice of law issues take an
inordinate amount of time and require a fairly complex analysis.
The current situation has been described in a variety of ways,
generally unfavorably. It is "a total disaster," "chaos," "gibberish,"
"a veritable playpen for judicial policymakers, .... a conflicts mine
field in a maze constructed by professors drunk on theories."' 16
IIl. CHANGING THE CHOICE OF LAW LANDSCAPE
Resolving the current disarray involves two questions, one
involving form, the other substance. The first question asks how
changes might be achieved, i.e., through federal action, state-by-
state legislation, changes in common law, or some other process.
The second question asks what standards or rules might take the
place of current choice of law methodologies.
Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions that address either
form or substance or both. Most of them focus on the desirability of
14. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 145-146 (1971).
15. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267, 282 (1966).
16. Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 Ind. L.J.
527, 527 (2000); Alfred Hill, For a Third Conflicts Restatement-But Stop Trying
to Reinvent the Wheel, 75 Ind. L.J. 535, 538 (2000); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third
Conflicts Restatement, 75 Ind. L.J. 403,403 (2000); Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d
550,551 (W. Va. 1986); Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice
235 (1993) [hereinafter Juenger, Choice of Law].
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a national uniform choice of law methodology. Why is national
uniformity so important? Most who advocate uniformity argue that
it will lead to predictability and discourage forum shopping. ' Prior
to the 1960s, all states followed the traditional First Restatement
method. This method privileged predictability over other goals such
as justice, rationality, and respect for state policies. It did not matter
where a case was filed; the law of the place of injury would govern
a tort case.' 8 This discouraged forum shopping and enabled parties
to predict the applicable law.
Once states began to follow their own methodologies, however,
it became imperative for attorneys to shop around-filing a case in
a traditional state, for example, when the law of the place of injury
favored the plaintiff. 9 Choice of law thus became a key factor in
forum shopping. Modern methodologies may favor important values
like the implementation of state policy, rationality, and justice, but
the variety and complexity of approaches have led to unpredictability.
"[T]he parties cannot know what law governs their conduct until after
they have acted. The resulting uncertainty is unfair, and it
discourages desirable interstate activity. ' 20 It is argued that a uniform
choice of law regime would reinstate predictability, and its adherents
hope that other values could be incorporated in the new methodology
as well.
Scholars disagree, however, on the best way to implement a
uniform approach. Some believe that the United States Congress
should pass a federal choice of law statute.2 Even assuming that this
is an area suitable for federal legislation, so far Congress has not
expressed sufficient interest in such a project. This is not surprising,
given the arcane nature of the subject matter and the fact that the
electorate has not clamored for action. Congress is more likely to
address choice of law issues in discrete areas, such as part of federal
products liability or mass disaster legislation,22 rather than involving
17. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case
for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1 (1991); Larry Kramer, On the
Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2134 (1991).
18. Obviously, there were exceptions to the rule. See Wiegand, supra note 5.
19. Both state and federal courts are bound to apply the state's choice of law
rules even though those rules may lead to the substantive law of another state.
States follow their own choice of law rules because, under choice of law analysis,
such rules are deemed procedural rather than substantive, and states are free to
apply their own procedural rules. Federal courts are bound to follow the states'
choice of laik rules under the mandate of Erie and Klaxon. See Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
20. Kramer, supra note 17, at 2137.
21. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., S. 10, 108th Cong. (2003) ("a bill to protect consumers in
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itself in a generalized all-encompassing choice of law code for tort,
contract, property, and other disputes. Federal legislation is unlikely
to lead to uniform rules or standards covering the vast array of choice
of law issues facing courts today.
Some scholars have proposed action by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Conference).23 That
body is comprised of "lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative
staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state
governments... to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform
state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and
practical. 24 Once the Conference has completed its work, state
legislatures are free to adopt, or not, the proposed law. An advantage
of uniform laws is that their implementation occurs only after they
have been subjected to state legislative debate and adoption. A law
adopted through the legislative process becomes positive law,
carrying with it the imprimatur of the state's legislative branch. If the
law is well drafted to provide clear guidance to courts, parties will at
least be able to predict the methodology that a court will follow and,
over time, may be able to predict results based on precedent.
Professor Larry Kramer argues as well that, in addition to
increased predictability, a Conference-drafted uniform law serves
substantive purposes. He notes that "in any true conflict, we have (at
least) two competing versions of justice, each associated with a
different sovereign. Because these sovereigns are, by definition,
coequal... we have no ground from which to judge one state's law
better or more just."25 Instead of asserting that one state's policy is
more important or just than another's, we should instead "think about
choice of law more like treaty negotiations, where the 'correctness'
of a particular solution is simply a matter of what the states agree to
do." "[T]he only 'right' answer is one the interested states agree
mutually to adopt. 2 1 States will agree to a rule that is even-handed
and reasonable, directing individual states to subordinate their
interests when they have less at stake, permitting them to assert their
managed care plans" and provides that certain civil actions be governed by the law
of the plaintiffs state). Congress is more likely to pass federal legislation that
preempts a particular field like products liability, rather than provides choice of law
rules for state and federal courts. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Pressure Increases
for Tighter Limits on Injury Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2003, at Al.
23. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 17; see also Juenger, Choice of Law, supra
note 16, at 416.
24. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, About
NCCUSL, at http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/Home-desktopdefault.aspx (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004).
25. Kramer, supra note 17, at 2140.
26. Id. at 2141.
27. Id. at 2143.
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interests when the stakes for them are higher. "Maximizing the
interests of different states can be done only on a more wholesale
basis: by identifying generally shared policies or policy preferences
and constructing rules that systematically advance these.
28
Encouraging states to act cooperatively means that there must be one
body of rules that states agree to follow, and, it is argued, the best
way to do that is through the work of the National Conference, a
body of representatives from all fifty states whose final product
undergoes consideration by individual state legislatures.
Others have proposed that the American Law Institute (ALI), a
body comprised of judges, lawyers, and law teachers, begin work on
a Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws. 29 Founded in 1923, ALI's
purpose is "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law
and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better
administration ofjustice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and
scientific legal work."30 Its bylaws "authorize an elected membership
of 3,000" consisting of "judges, lawyers, and law teachers from all
areas of the United States as well as some foreign countries, selected
on the basis of professional achievement and demonstrated interest
in the improvement of the law."'"
A Reporter, chosen by the Institute, prepares the initial draft
which is then submitted to a small group of experts in the field.32 The
draft is thereafter revised, likely multiple times, and submitted to "the
Council of the Institute, a group consisting of some sixty prominent
judges, practicing lawyers, and law teachers" before it is finally
approved by the entire Institute membership. 33 "The final product,
the work of highly competent group scholarship, thus reflects the
searching review and criticism of learned and experienced members
of the bench and bar."
34
The advantages of a Third Restatement for choice of law are
several. After more than thirty years since its inception, the
28. ld. at 2145.
29. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, The Restatement (Second): Some Not So Fine
Tuning for a Restatement (Third): A Very Well-Curried Leflar over Reese with
Korn on the Side (Or Is It Cob?), 75 Ind. L.J. 561 (2000); William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75
Ind. L.J. 417 (2000); Joseph William Singer, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind
the Curtain: The Place of Better Law in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 Ind.
L.J. 659 (2000); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts
Restatement (And a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 Ind. L.J. 437 (2000).
30. The American Law Institute, Certificate of Incorporation, available at
http://www.ali.org/ali/01-Certificate03.pdf.
31. The American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, at






Restatement (Second) clearly has become the courts' favorite modem
methodology. As noted above, nearly half of the states follow the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, though they do not
necessarily follow it closely or faithfully. A new Restatement would
likely build on this popular approach and would therefore be familiar
to judges and lawyers. Critics of the Restatement (Second), however,
note that its complexity and ambiguity make it difficult to apply,
allow judges too much discretion, and lead to unpredictability. 3 The
new Restatement could fine-tune the old, retaining its strengths and
jettisoning its weaknesses.
Such a project has its disadvantages as well. First of all, it would
take a long time; the Restatement (Second) project spanned nearly
twenty years.36 Furthermore, those who draft new "restatements" do
not necessarily represent all states and all viewpoints. They are a
select group of scholars and choice of law "experts" chosen by other
select groups of scholars and "experts." They have dedicated much
of their professional lives to devising their own theories about what
works and what does not.
A new Restatement, like the last, will be anything but a
"restatement" of the law,37 in part because the law varies markedly
from state to state and even from court to court within each state.
This area of the law is simply too unsettled. Instead the new
Restatement will be an entirely new product cobbled together by a
variety of scholars, all of whom have their own idea of what choice
of law should look like.
The proposal for a uniform law may seem quite reasonable
regardless of whether the National Conference or the ALI draft it.
However, aside from the fact that neither has yet taken up the
gauntlet, there is little agreement about the substance of a uniform
law. More than sixty years have passed since the first Restatement,
and "the theoretical debates are reaching the point of diminishing
returns . . . . The theoretical scholarship, while adequate to
demonstrate the faults of the First Restatement, does not seem to be
able to produce consensus on the proper modem approach. 38 Until
the Conference or ALI begin work on such a project, it is hard to
predict what its result would be, and it may be that each body would
35. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 16; Hill, supra note 16.
36. The ALI began work in 1952 and approved the final draft in 1969. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
37. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 29, at 561 (arguing that the Institute should
adopt a Model Act, rather than a "restatement": "whatever we come up with will
almost certainly not restate the conflicts law .... Although this did not deter the
drafters of the Second Restatement, to be honest and avoid misleading, our product
should not be called a restatement.").
38. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 426-27.
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face the same challenge as that faced by other groups attempting to
find national consensus in this area.
For example, one scholar asserts that any new proposal "should
contain no rigid rules" except for "two presumption-raising,
jurisdiction-selecting rules," should add two factors to the current
"seven choice-influencing factors," and "should prohibit the weighing
of 'Currie interests' in true conflicts."39
Another encourages the drafters to "shift from the present heavy
emphasis on territorialism to interest analysis," at least for loss-
distribution tort issues.4" Yet another argues that drafters of a new
Restatement should "consider every principle and rule.., not only in
light of domestic scenarios but of international disputes as well" and
should "work comparatively," i.e., "look at foreign conflicts law" as
well as American conflicts law. 4
1
One scholar is "troubled by any project that seeks to govern choice
of law by rules rather than an approach," 42 while another believes "that
some type of rules are necessary., 43 The latter would abandon the
Second Restatement's rules and instead adopt "flexible rules with
built-in escapes which will allow courts enough freedom to deviate in
exceptional cases."'
Some of those quoted above would no doubt participate in the
drafting of a Third Restatement or uniform law. It appears that they
are no more in agreement about the substance of a new methodology
than the drafters of the Second Restatement were. The result of that
earlier process was a mishmash of rules, presumptions, and factors,
reflecting a process that incorporated everyone's ideas. It appears at
this stage that a Third Restatement or uniform law would do the same.
An additional disadvantage of a Third Restatement is that, unlike
the process for a proposed "uniform law" described above, the final
draft of a Restatement does not receive legislative consideration and
approval. It is given only the weight any court determines to give it,
and courts are unlikely to apply the new Restatement in a uniform, and
hence, predictable manner. That has certainly been true for the
Restatement (Second), and there is yet no reason to believe that a new
Restatement will fare any better.
In fact, the likelihood of achieving a national uniform approach
to choice of law appears doubtful, at least in the foreseeable future.
39. Posnak, supra note 29, at 562.
40. William A. Reppy, Jr., Codifying Interest Analysis in the Torts Chapter of
a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 Ind. L.J. 591, 593-94 (2000).
41. Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement-For the International Age, 75 Ind.
L.J. 575, 584-85 (2000).
42. Gary J. Simson, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 Ind. L.J. 649, 654 (2000).




There simply is no national consensus about the best approach and,
to date, primarily legal scholars have been engaged in the debate. If
they cannot agree on the best approach, it is unlikely that any other
body will be able to do so.
A. State-by-State Approach
What then is the solution to this troubling state of affairs? I
propose that we abandon the search for a national uniform approach
to choice of law. So long as we have fifty independent sovereign
states, each with its own idea of what best represents its interests and
what is just, each with its own unique body of statutory and common
law, we will have fifty different approaches to this issue as well.
Nothing is wrong with that.
For example, West Virginia is quite adamant that it rejects
modem approaches to choice of law tort issues. In 1986, when faced
with that specific question, the court clearly rejected the "modem"
Restatement (Second), calling it "pretty intellectual," but noting, "we
still prefer a rule. The lesson of history is that methods of analysis
that permit dissection of the jural bundle constituting a tort and its
environment produce protracted litigation and voluminous,
inscrutable appellate opinions, while rules get cases settled quickly
and cheaply." The court added:
[W]e remain convinced that the traditional rule, for all of its
faults, remains superior to any of its modem competitors.
Moreover, if we are going to manipulate conflicts doctrine in
order to achieve substantive results, we might as well
manipulate something we understand. Having mastered
marble, we decline an apprenticeship in bronze. We therefore
reaffirm our adherence to the doctrine of lex loci delicti
today.46
Wisconsin courts, too, have announced a policy for choice of law
decisions that other states might not accept. In a number of cases, the
state's highest court has articulated a strong state policy of
compensating victims, even those who are not Wisconsin residents.47
Such a court might be reluctant to abandon its own policy in the
interest of national uniformity.
45. Paul v. National Life, 352 S.W.2d 550, 554 (W. Va. 1986).
46. Id. at 556. After announcing its adherence to the place-of-injury rule, the
court then employed the public policy exception to that rule and applied West
Virginia law to a car accident that occurred in Indiana. Id.
47. See, e.g., Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 204 N.W.2d 897, 905 (Wis.
1973); Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Wis. 1968).
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If we value predictability, rather than sacrificing state
individuality for it, we can achieve some success by improving
choice of law methodologies state by state, ensuring that when a
lawsuit is filed in State X, we can predict at least the choice of law
methodology State X will follow and determine in advance the
applicable law. This proposal rejects a uniform approach. Some will
argue that choice of law results then will be determined by the forum
that the plaintiff chooses. Well, yes, probably. But that is part of the
litigative decision made every day by plaintiffs, and choice of law
plays but one role in that decision. So long as states have different
court procedures, standards of proof, rules for the introduction of
evidence, remedies including damage measurements and caps, and a
variety of different laws and processes that may influence the final
outcome, plaintiffs will shop for the most favorable forum. That is
the price we pay for a federation of fifty sovereign states.
Furthermore, it should come as no surprise to anyone that laws
change as one crosses state boundaries. When one enters a new state,
one is surely aware that driving laws change. One state requires
motorcyclists to wear helmets, another does not. One requires
seatbelts, another does not. One permits radar detectors, or a right
hand turn on a red light, another does not. Corporations doing
business in more than one state know they must be aware of different
laws, and parties involved in litigation surely would not be shocked
that states employ different choice of law methodologies.
Once we acknowledge that a one-size-fits-all approach to choice
of law is unrealistic (and perhaps undesirable as well), we can instead
focus our efforts on improving choice of law methodology state by
state. Once again we face the question of how and what.
One obvious path to choice of law improvement within each state
is through the courts. Clearly, courts in any particular state can
choose to reject that state's current choice of law methodology and
adopt a new and improved methodology. They have certainly done
so before and, in fact, often seem to do so on a regular basis.
However, reliance upon common law has led to the current quandary,
and this process has not resulted in predictability. Courts have
generally reached what they believe are fair and just results, but
choice of law determinations too often depend upon the discretion of
each individual judge. It is true that judges frequently rely upon their
sound discretion in a variety of areas, but in many cases the
legislative branch provides statutory discretionary boundaries. Such
is not the case for choice of law, currently. Here judges choose the
applicable methodology and apply it without any legislative guidance
at all. For the most part, they attempt to effectuate "state policy" by
reliance upon complex and ambiguous choice of law methodologies
that permit, even require, broad discretion. Continuing to rely on
2004]
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common law for choice of law guidance will only perpetuate the
current disarray.
Legislation is another means of effecting choice of law
improvement. In fact, choice of law statutes can be found in all
states, but these are quite specific and are not intended to provide
general choice of law rules. Perhaps the best example can be found
in various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
designate the choice of law for particular sections of the Code.48 In
addition, a number of states have adopted borrowing statutes that
designate the applicable statute of limitations in a multistate case.49
State legislatures have also enacted choice of law provisions for other
discrete areas of the law, generally as part of an overall legislative
scheme for that particular area, but it is rare to find legislatures
enacting as a separate matter a wholesale approach to choice of law.
Some of the primary goals for any choice of law regime are
predictability, fairness, justice, and ease of application. That can best
be achieved when the choice of law methodology is clear and
unchanging and when courts' discretion is bound by legislative
direction. Creating a choice of law code that has undergone
legislative scrutiny and deliberation is more likely to lead to just
results.
Predictability and ease of application can best be achieved when
those faced with choice of law issues can consult a clear, accessible,
unambiguous, affordable source for the answer, without the necessity
of consulting a variety of sources or requiring detailed legal briefs.
A state choice of law statute satisfies the concern for predictability,
fair results, and ease of application if it is well-drafted and
incorporates well-reasoned substantive results.
In fact, many scholars are in agreement that legislative action is
the best approach. "[l1t gives litigants and courts an indisputably
authoritative text" to which they can turn." "Determinate choice-of-
law rules would confer three benefits that are missing in the present
state of chaos": predictability, administrative efficiency, and
uniformity [within each state] that results in a level playing field
("even-handed justice").1 Professor Nafziger notes that "25 civil law
jurisdictions abroad" have enacted choice of law codes in the last
48. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-301, 4A-507, 5-116, 9-103 (2004).
49. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 361 (2004); Fla. Stat. § 95.10 (2003); Idaho
Code § 5-239 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-45 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.020
(2003); Wis. Stat. § 893.07 (2003).
50. Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 La. L. Rev. 1061, 1064
(2000).
51. Michael H. Gottesman, supra note 16, at 528-29.
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52forty years, so American attempts would not mark an abrupt
departure from international approaches.
Recently, two states have made the attempt, passing comprehensive
choice of law codes. These efforts certainly merit attention, though the
first attempt has been met with mixed reviews. Louisiana was the first
to try such an approach, and in 1992, its new choice of law codification
became effective.53 It is the culmination of a four year project, begun
when conflict of laws Professor Symeon Symeonides, serving as
Reporter, drafted the articles. They were thereafter "debated, amended,
and eventually adopted, first one by one and then in toto, by an
Advisory Committee and then by the Council of the Louisiana State
Law Institute."'" The completed, approved project was only then
submitted to the Louisiana legislature for adoption. The new Code
consists of eight major sections5" and thirty-six articles governing the
status of persons, the validity of marriage and divorce, marital property
rights, succession to movables and immovables, rights to real and
personal property, capacity to enter a contract, validity of contracts,
issues of conduct and safety, issues of loss distribution, and a host of
other specific issues unique to one of the eight major areas.56
The codification reflects threads of modem choice of law
methodologies drawn from a variety of sources. For example, the
overriding principle for all cases "having contacts with other states" is
that courts should apply "the law of the state whose policies would be
most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue."5 This
principle of comparative impairment is generally associated with
Professor William Baxter and the well-known case, Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club,"8 though the new code's drafter notes that "the two
approaches have much less in common than their acoustic resemblance
might suggest."59  The Louisiana statute borrows factors from
Restatement (Second) as well, noting that in order for the court to
determine that state whose policy will be least impaired involves an
evaluation of
the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of all
involved states in the light of: (1) the relationship of each
52. James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon's Project to Codify Choice of Law Rules, 60
La. L. Rev. 1189, 1199 (2000).
53. See La. Civ. Code arts. 14, 3515-3549.
54. Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort
Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677, 684 (1992).
55. General Provisions, Status, Marital Property, Successions, Real Rights,
Conventional Obligations (contracts), Delictual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations
(torts), and Liberative Prescription (statutes of limitation).
56. La. Civ. Code arts. 14, 3515-3549.
57. Id. art. 3515.
58. 546 P.2d 719 (Calif.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976).
59. Symeonides, supra note 54, at 691.
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state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and
needs of the interstate and international systems, including the
policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of
minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from
subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.'
Not surprisingly, the traditional situs rule prevails; real property
rights are governed by the law of the situs.6 1 As with other modem
methodologies, the remainder of the statute is short on rules and long on
standards. Contract issues are "governed by the law of the state whose
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to
that issue," taking into account the "strength and pertinence of the
relevant policies of the involved states in the light of' various contract-
related factors.62
General tort issues are dealt with similarly.63 However, borrowing
from New York's distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-
regulating rules,' the statute provides that the place of injury-causing
conduct determines the law to be applied for "[i]ssues pertaining to
standards of conduct and safety ... if the injury occurred in that state or
in another state whose law did not provide for a higher standard of
conduct."65 Otherwise, the law of the place of injury applies if "the
person whose conduct caused the injury should have foreseen its
occurrence in that state."' If the conduct occurred in Louisiana by a
person domiciled in Louisiana, or by one who "had another significant
connection with" Louisiana, then Louisiana law would apply.67
Issues involving "loss distribution and financial protection" are
governed by a specific subsection as well. If the tortfeasor and victim
are domiciled in the same state, that state's law applies.6" If they do not
share a domicile, then other rules apply with an emphasis on place of
injury. 69
Products liability cases receive special attention. Louisiana law
applies if the injury occurred in Louisiana to a Louisiana domiciliary or
if the "product was manufactured, produced, or acquired in" Louisiana
and injured a Louisiana domiciliary anywhere.7°
60. La. Civ. Code art. 3515.
61. Id. art. 3535.
62. Id. art. 3537.
63. See id. art. 3542.
64. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
65. La. Civ. Code art. 3543.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 3544.
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 3545.
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The statute contains an exception to the specific tort rules when
the "totality of circumstances of an exceptional case" indicate clearly
"that the policies of another state would be more seriously impaired
if its law were not applied to the particular issue."'"
Given the history and development of choice of law analysis over
the past several decades, it is clear that Louisiana's code has
incorporated many of the features of modem methodology, and, like
the Restatement (Second), has opted for a combination of rules and
standards, with emphasis on standards and policies. This is neither
good nor bad in and of itself. It simply represents one
approach-that of reducing years of national choice of law
jurisprudence to positive statutory law. The advantages of such an
approach are many.
First, the analysis has been subjected to judicial scrutiny as well
as to scholarly debate. Most of this has taken place outside of
Louisiana, of course; the notion of comparative impairment has been
borrowed from California courts and loss distribution/conduct
regulation from New York courts.72 But regardless of the source,
modern methodologies have been time-tested, interpreted, and
debated. They are familiar to many.
Second, the Louisiana project has received legislative scrutiny
and approval. Thus, both the legislative and judicial branches
(though not necessarily the Louisiana judicial branch) have placed
their stamps of approval on various aspects of the methodology.
How well does the new codification hold up? Two scholars have
examined the Code's application. Professor Patrick J. Borchers,
believing that "[p]redictability is... an important value in the law, 73
measured "the affirmance rate in Louisiana by appellate courts of
trial court conflicts decisions before and after the codification. 74
Affirmance rates, he reasoned, "are a reasonable proxy for decisional
predictability."75 The affirmance rate improved from fifty-two and
nine tenths percent before the new code to seventy-six and two tenths
percent, results that he finds "hopeful and suggestive that
comprehensive conflicts codifications can produce significant
benefits. 76
Professor Russell J. Weintraub, too, examined the effect of
Louisiana's codification. After examining thirty-two contracts cases
71. Id. art. 3547.
72. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Calif.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 859, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y.
1963); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
73. Borchers, supra note 50, at 1069.
74. Id. at 1061.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1062.
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decided under the new code, he concluded that "fifteen misapply the
articles in the most fundamental manner" and that "[oinly five, or
perhaps six cases apply the Code as the drafters intended. He
notes that "[j]udges are not stupid, just busy" and that "[tihey meet
choice of law issues rarely., 78 Despite a lengthy article explaining
the new code written by the project's reporter, plus numerous
comments to each of its provisions, courts still have had a difficult
time applying it. Professor Weintraub blames the difficulty on the
fact that so few lawyers know anything about conflict of laws as a
subject:
When bar examiners took the subject off the bar
examinations, attendance in the course plummeted.
Louisiana's experience with its Conflict of Laws Code is not
unique. All over the country, state and federal courts that
purport to be following one of the new choice of law methods
list territorial contacts and select law without knowing
whether it matters what law applies.79
Despite these mixed reviews, one other state decided to attempt
a conflict of laws statutory approach. In 2001, Oregon adopted the
"first phase" of a legislative project to codify choice of law in that
state.8° As with Louisiana's conflicts law, the project began with a
state law reform commission, and a well-known academic scholar8'
served as Reporter for the project.8 2 The first phase of the legislation,
signed into law on May 21, 2001, deals only with contract choice of
law issues.83 It is designed "to provide a clear, comprehensive set of
choice of law rules to replace the jumble of rather ambiguous and
unstable jurisprudence created by Oregon courts" and "to overcome
the lex fori orientation of judicial decisions while protecting Oregon
interests, especially those of its residents, to the greatest extent
possible."'84 Although its approach is different from that of
Louisiana, it too grants broad discretion to courts while at the same
time providing them with presumptive rules. The approach most
closely resembles that of the Restatement (Second) but with a heavier
emphasis on rules.
77. Russell J. Weintraub, Courts Flailing in the Waters of the Louisiana
Conflicts Code: Not Waving but Drowning, 60 La. L. Rev. 1365, 1365-66 (2000).
78. Id. at 1366.
79. Id. at 1376-77.
80. James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon's Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts, 38
Willamette L. Rev. 397, 397 (2002); see also 2001 Or. Laws 164; H.B. 2414, 71st
Leg. (Or. 2001).
81. Willamette University College of Law Professor James A.R. Nafziger.
82. Nafziger, supra note 52, at 1189.
83. Nafziger, supra note 80, at 397.
84. Id. at 398-99.
[Vol. 65
SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND
For example, Oregon law applies to a "contract for construction
work to be performed primarily in Oregon," 5 to a "contract of
employment for services to be rendered primarily in Oregon by a
resident of Oregon," to "a consumer contract, if... the consumer is
a resident of Oregon at the time of contracting and . . . the
consumer's assent to the contract is obtained in Oregon, or the
consumer is induced to enter into the contract in substantial measure
by an invitation or advertisement in Oregon. ''86
Presumptive rules apply to specific types of contracts "unless a
party demonstrates that the application of [the specified] law would
be clearly inappropriate under the principles of Section 9" of the
act. 7 The presumptive rules include applying the situs rule to
contracts involving real property, the place of performance for
personal services contracts, and the place of a franchise's operation
for franchise contracts.88 The statute honors "effective choice by the
parties, '"89 but contracts not otherwise addressed in the statute are
governed by the broad standard set forth in Section 9: "the law, in
light of the multistate elements of the contract, that is the most
appropriate for a resolution of that issue.'"90 In making that
determination, courts should identify "the states that have a relevant
connection with the transaction or the parties," identify their
underlying policies, and evaluate
the relative strength and pertinence of these policies in...
meeting the needs and giving effect to the policies of the
interstate and international systems; and ... facilitating the
planning of transactions, protecting a party from undue
imposition by another party, giving effect to justified
expectations of the parties ... and minimizing adverse effects
on strong legal policies of other states. 91
The Oregon commission considered not only the varied judicial
decisions concerning choice of law in Oregon but also other models
including "the Rome Convention of the European Union, German
law, Swiss law, a Puerto Rican draft law, and the Louisiana law. 92
It remains to be seen whether the new law will achieve its goals.
Several observations can be made about these two state projects.
They clearly signal that some have given up on the notion that a
85. 2001 Or. Laws 164 § 3(2); H.B. 2414, 71st Leg. § 3(2) (Or. 2001).
86. H.B. 2414 §§ 3(3) & 3(4), 71t Leg. (Or. 2001).
87. Id. § 10.
88. Id.
89. See id. §§ 7, 8.
90. Id. § 9.
91. Id.
92. Nafziger, supra note 80, at 399.
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national or federal approach to choice of law is imminent or,
perhaps, wise. In both cases, academic scholars led the projects,
relying on their familiarity with other modem methodologies
including those used internationally. They reviewed the state's
judicial opinions involving choice of law but did not feel bound by
such decisions. In the end, they relied heavily on aspects of modem
methodologies and arrived at what they believe are new and
improved versions. In the case of Louisiana, that meant heavy
reliance upon the Restatement (Second) and Baxter's comparative
impairment approach. For Oregon, it meant reliance upon the
presumptive-rule-combined-with-mandated-policy-considerations
approach of Restatement (Second).
IV. GIvING JUDGES THEIR DUE: JURISPRUDENCE-BASED
LEGISLATION
My proposal is different. It builds on the efforts of Louisiana
and Oregon by suggesting that each state adopt a general choice of
law code. It differs in these respects:
" States should begin their codification process by engaging in
careful empirical research involving statistical analysis of all
available cases in the state (including federal district and
circuit court cases);
* States should adopt legislation founded on that state's
jurisprudence rather than on academic theoretical models;
* The state's choice of law code should reflect a rules-based
regime rather than relying on a less precise approach or set
of standards;
" The new rules should be based on real cases in that state's
courts, rather than created from whole cloth.
1. Empirical Research
It has been suggested that empirical research should precede any
attempt to draft a Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws.93 I believe
empirical research should precede attempts to draft state legislation
as well. Until recently the only empirical research involving choice
of law consisted of an annual survey of all American cases focusing
primarily on the methodology used.' But recently, "a new type of
93. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Empiricism and Theory in Conflicts Law, 75
Ind. L.J. 509 (2000); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 434.
94. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2003); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001: Fifteenth Annual
Survey, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2002).
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scholarship has begun to emerge. Unlike the theoretical work, it is
inductive, rather than deductive. . . . It reasons from multiple
results in actual cases toward choice-of-law rules of thumb that
courts actually follow."95 This kind of empirical research conducted
state by state might yield surprising results that can be helpful in
fashioning a new approach to choice of law.
The process would begin with the establishment of a body of
interested people-lawyers, judges, legislators, and scholars-who
are entrusted with the work of empirical research and drafting a new
choice of law code.96 Such research should examine the entire body
of choice of law cases within the individual state.
In addition to the type of empirical research that simply reviews
all state cases in order to determine whether choice of law rules
might emerge, another type of empirical research involves statistical
analysis of choice of law decisions. 97 Two such studies have yielded
interesting results that can guide statewide projects.
The first study attempted to determine whether critics of modem
choice of law methodologies are correct.98 Such critics believe that
modem approaches lack predictability and ease of application and
that they are "pro-resident, pro-forum-law, pro-recovery." 99
The study's author divided the fifty states into two groups:
"those fourteen states expressly retaining the traditional situs [or lex
loci] approach, and the remaining thirty-six"" that had adopted
some form of modem methodology. He examined only "published
private tort cases ... in state supreme courts or the United States
Courts of Appeals, from January 1, 1970, to June 30, 1988 .... ."'01
The findings were significant: modem approaches favor plaintiffs,
forum law, and residents.10 2
The study's author suggested that states resisting the trend toward
modem approaches consider the study's implications before making
95. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 427.
96. A number of states already have commissions in place for revising state
laws. See Nafziger, supra note 52, at 1189 n. 1 ("In 1997, Oregon became 'at least'
the sixteenth state to establish a commission for revising local law .... "). The
Oregon Commission solicited law reform project proposals, selected one, and
thereafter formed a specialized "study group" to work on the project. Id. at 1189-
90.
97. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 29, at 427-28.
98. Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of
Law, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 49 (1989).
99. Id. at 50 (quoting L. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of
Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 398 (1980)).
100. Id. at 78.
101. Id. at 81. He notes that "those courts are the ones with the highest
publication rates and are generally conceded to undertake most of the law
development function." Id. at 82.
102. Id. at 86-89.
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a change: "modem theories of choice of law, at least in application,
are inevitably pro-recovery."1 °3
The second study utilizing statistical analysis also examined
various conflicts methodologies to determine whether they favored
forum law, recovery for plaintiffs, or local parties. 10 Limited like the
first to tort cases, this study included all reported decisions, state and
federal, trial and appellate."0 5 Unlike the first study, it differentiated
among the various "modem" approaches and included over 800
reported tort cases dating back to 1960.106 This study's author
categorized the cases state by state, indicating the methodology each
purported to follow. He concluded that
the great divide in American choice of law is still between the
First Restatement and everything else. With respect to the
degree to which the competing methodologies favor forum
law, only the First Restatement shows a statistically
significant variation from the other approaches.
Similarly, the First Restatement shows a statistically
significant propensity to apply recovery-favoring rules less
often.107
Although not as clearly different from modern
methodologies, "the First Restatement is probably the least
generous to locals."'0 8  The author also concluded that
modem approaches are not that much different from one
another. They all favor forum law, plaintiffs, and residents."
Furthermore, the author concluded that because each different
modem choice of law methodology "should yield different patterns
of results in tort cases,"11 the fact that they do not means that they
"do not work as they should." '111 Assuming that each state adopts a
particular methodology to achieve a particular purpose or to fulfill a
particular state policy, it is significant that the choice of methodology
makes little difference in the result. The author concludes that "[t]he
reason .. . that all of the modem approaches perform nearly
identically in practice is that none of them is much of a check on
103. Id. at 93.
104. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice oj Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 358 n.ll.
107. Id. at 377.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 377-78. See also Borchers, supra note 93, at 509.
110. Borchers, supra note 104, at 364.
111. Id. at 378 (emphasis in original).
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judicial discretion."'1 2 Courts will do whatever it takes to reach the
preferred substantive result. 13 One might also add then that the fuss
among scholars about the best method seems, well, academic. The
study's author urges courts to "admit candidly-as do courts in states
that follow Leflar's [better law] approach-that substantive
preferences control results in multistate cases.'1 14
This article proposes to take empirical research one step further
in order to arrive at a proposal for state-by-state transformation of
choice of law methodology. If, as it appears, it does not matter too
much what modem methodology courts follow (in contrast to
traditional or First Restatement methods), and if substantive
preferences drive choice of law results, then it makes sense to have
this out in the open.
The approach would begin with statewide empirical research and
analysis of that research, thereafter transforming the result into
statutory law after legislative discussion and approval. Using what
courts have created and the legislature has approved would at least
encourage respect for the end product.
2. Legislation Founded on Jurisprudence
My proposal suggests a closer adherence to state-by-state
jurisprudence, relying not so much upon academic scholarly opinion
as on time-tested opinions of the state's own judiciary. I am not
alone in suggesting that non-academic authors might well come up
with a workable approach to choice of law. Others have suggested
that we should leave choice of law scholars out of the process
altogether and permit lawyers and judges to resolve the issue.
Professor Michael Gottesman argues that, "from the trenches, most
[conflicts scholars] look alike. Each waxes eloquent about the search
for the perfect solution-the most intellectually and morally
satisfying choice of law for each dispute-and each ends the
theorizing by embracing some proposition that will prove wholly
indeterminate in practice.""'  He states that scholars made the
attempt once before, and it led to the Second Restatement.
an approach incorporating all their conflicting proposals: a
cacophonous formula of formulae, a blend of indeterminate
indeterminacy .... [a] total disaster in practice .... Now,
they're at it again. They propose to clean up their last mess
by concocting another. The mistake last time, they think, was
112. Id. at379-80.
113. Id. at 382.
114. Id.
115. Gottesman, supra note 16, at 527.
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that they compromised with each other. Now it's time to
adopt one single-minded indeterminate formula, and each
proclaims that it should be "mine!"'
116
Instead, he proposes that
the new vehicle should be built by a different crowd. Let
judges, lawyers and/or legislators-those who live in the real
world and have to suffer the consequences of the choices
made-have a hand at formulating a new solution, one that
would contain determinate choice of law formulae that work
in practice." 7
Many judges have already played a significant role in formulating
choice of law rules through years of jurisprudence. Clearly, courts
are well suited to making such individual determinations. After all,
their task is to interpret the law, and this process inevitably involves
choosing one law's interpretation over another. Often the real value
of judicial decision-making is that over time the decisions form a
body of law that then serves as a guide, providing society with
predictability and uniform application of the law. If choice of law
decisions have not accomplished this, perhaps it is because modern
approaches to choice of law are too complex and open-ended to
provide adequate guidance to busy judges. If that is the case, as it
appears to be, then continuing to rely on case-by-case decision-
making will not improve the situation. But if judges have not arrived
at a clear choice of law methodology, who should?
It makes little sense to permit only legal scholars, many of whom
have never practiced law or served as judges, to define the
methodology that courts should follow. Because legal scholars
control the academic conversation, and because they eagerly step
forward when reform is in the air, they may be tempted to disregard
years of judicial decision-making in the area of choice of law. It is
important to note that both the Louisiana and Oregon projects
involved not only legal scholars but also members of the bench and
bar.1 8 In both cases, the projects began with an examination of state
judicial decisions related to choice of law. In Oregon, the drafters
found that courts used a variety of methodologies but were able to
elicit some general principles that appeared in the cases. In the end,
however, the Oregon drafters replaced "the jumble of rather
ambiguous and unstable jurisprudence created by Oregon courts"
116. Id.
117. Id.




with their own "clear, comprehensive set of choice-of-law rules."1'19
In Louisiana, though the new code purports to "codifty], update[],
and streamline[] Louisiana conflicts jurisprudence,"' 2 ° it also draws
heavily on jurisprudence outside of the state, on pre-existing
Louisiana Civil Code provisions, and on developments in other parts
of the country and world.
Given the history of these two state projects, one might be
tempted to assume that it is futile to attempt a state "restatement" of
the law and that one should instead start from scratch. I do not agree.
I believe that incorporating as much as possible existing
jurisprudence and then seeking legislative approval for the product
is more likely to ensure predictability, sound substantive results, and
ease of application.
3. Codification Based on Rules
As noted, two states, Louisiana and Oregon, have adopted broad-
ranging choice of law statutes. Both rely upon an "approach"
methodology combined with choice of law rules. This makes sense,
since no proposal can possibly anticipate the myriad of factual
circumstances that may demand choice of law resolution. My
proposal, while acknowledging the need for a fallback principle to
resolve the unforeseen, favors rules primarily because common law
"approach" methodologies have not resulted in predictability or even
state-wide uniformity, and I believe it is unlikely that pure
"approach" legislation would fare much better. Such methodologies
simply leave too much to the discretion of those applying them
without providing adequate guidance.
Choice of law scholars tend to fall into one of the two camps.
Those who favor an approach rather than rules reject rigid rules, such
as application of the law of the place of injury for tort and place of
making for contract. They note that the First Restatement consisted
largely of rules, and it has been soundly condemned by the majority
of conflicts scholars as well as the majority of states. 2 They argue
that such rules do not fairly consider policy and frequently ignore the
significant contacts that the parties and events may have with one
particular jurisdiction. 22 They generally favor less rigidity and more
judicial discretion.123
119. Nafziger, supra note 80, at 398; see also Nafziger, supra note 52, at 1194-
95.
120. Symeonides, supra note 54, at 678.
121. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 17, at 2-11.
122. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989).




Those who advocate an approach rather than rules might be most
satisfied with something like a modified Restatement (Second) with
its presumptive rules eliminated. This approach would take into
consideration not only the place of injury or place of contracting but
also the forum's interest, the interest of all the parties, policies of the
substantive area of the law, domiciles of all involved, and other
factors illustrated throughout the current Restatement (Second). 2 4
Individual courts would consider all of these factors to arrive at the
law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the
events and parties (as the current Restatement (Second) states), or the
law of the state whose policies would be most impaired if its law was
not applied (as Louisiana's choice of law code provides), or some
similar standard. This way, approach adherents argue, all factors,
policies and interests have been considered, and only after that can a
court make a well-reasoned choice of law decision.
My proposal rejects an "approach" methodology and favors rules.
However, it differs significantly from the First Restatement whose
territorial rules were not founded on policy or state interest; rather
they were based on the notion that a right "vests" upon some specific
occurrence and the place of vesting determines the applicable law,
regardless of other circumstances and events. Thus, in Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll,25 an Alabama railroad
employee working for an Alabama employer was denied the
application of Alabama law when he was injured after another
Alabama employee negligently failed to fix a defective train car link
in Alabama.' 6 Though the negligence occurred in Alabama, the link
itself did not give way until the train entered Mississippi. 27 Under
Mississippi law, the injured employee could not sue for his co-
employee's negligence.12 A rule based on vesting considers only the
place of injury.
A body of rules that instead has already taken into consideration
a number of other contacts, interests, and policies would surely be
preferable to one based only upon vesting, If such a rule is based
upon the state's prior rulings and thoughtful reasoning, it is certainly
arguable that it already takes into account such factors.
For example, a New York woman is injured when a tire falls off
her car in New Jersey. A New York mechanic improperly installed
the tire in New York. Under traditional choice of law rules, the right
124. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6 (Choice-of-Law
Principles), 145 (Tort-The General Principle), & 188 (Contract-Law Governing in
Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties).
125. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 804.
128. Id. at 809.
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to sue vested in New Jersey, and New Jersey law would apply. A New
York choice of law rule, drawn from New Yorkjurisprudence,12 1 might
apply the law of the common domicile, i.e., the law of the state in
which both the plaintiff and defendant are domiciled. Thus, New York
law would apply, and that choice is not merely arbitrary. Both parties
have chosen to make New York their home. They have accepted the
rights and privileges associated with that choice, and they should
accept the responsibilities as well. Furthermore, it should come as no
surprise to them (a key due process concern) that New York law would
apply to their actions. Thus a choice of law rule based on policy and
reasoning provides not only a fairer, more just result, but it offers
certainty and predictability to the parties and their attorneys, as well as
to the court system. In addition, the legislature, by adopting such a
rule, adds its own imprimatur. The rule is simple and just and it is
based on judicial reasoning and legislative approval.
In fact, one scholar notes that "[t]heoretical support for bringing
back rule-orientation to American tort conflicts law has recently come
forth from an academic quarter that for a long time neglected choice of
law as an object of research: law and economics" because "clear
choice of law rules increase efficiency by enabling parties to
determine, at low cost and ex ante, the law that applies to their
activities."' 30 Judge Richard Posner has observed that "the economic
obiective of any procedural system is to reduce two types of costs:
judicial error and judicial system transaction costs."' 31 Transaction
costs rise when the law is uncertain, 32 and modern choice of law
"approach" methodologies have not led to certainty. Judge Posner has
also opined,
[t]he opponents of mechanical rules of conflict of laws may
have given too little weight to the virtues of simplicity. The
new, flexible standards, such as "interest analysis," have
caused pervasive uncertainty, higher cost of litigation, more
forum shopping (a court has a natural inclination to apply the
law it is most familiar with - the forum's law - and will find it
easier to go with this inclination if the conflict of laws rules are
uncertain), and an uncritical drift in favor of plaintiffs. 133
129. New York's "Neumeier rules" evolved from a well-known New York case,
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
130. Jan Kropholler & Jan von Hein, From Approach to Rule-Orientation in
American Tort Conflicts?, in Law and Justice in a Multistate World: Essays in
Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren 325 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C.
Symeonides eds., 2002).
131. Solimine, supra note 98, at 59 (citing R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 553-54 (3d ed. 1986)).
132. Id. at 59-60.
133. Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1987).
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A rules approach does not mean that the First Restatement will
be revitalized. Instead, the new rules should incorporate a state's
policies and interests as reflected in prior choice of law decisions,
thereby respecting judicial reasoning and incorporating important
state goals. One international scholar has noted that European
countries, unlike the United States, favor choice of law rules. He
notes, "The certainty of rules is deemed more important than their
flexibility in continental Europe."' 34 He adds, "This does not mean
that interests, practical concerns, and desirability of results play no
role in European conflicts law."' 35 Instead, they are "taken into
account at the rule-making stage."' 36
4. Rules Based on Jurisprudence
In order to implement state interests and policies in the new
rules, I propose that they be based on the findings of the analysis
described above. The analysis would focus on ferreting out a choice
of law rule, even in its nascent stage, rather than on the court's
specific methodology. Careful analysis may reveal rules though the
court has not yet articulated them as such. At least one can ascertain
in the opinions an articulation of state policy that should be honored
if feasible. Reviewing the cases carefully can produce answers to
some of the questions raised in the two earlier empirical studies:
Are this state's choice of law decisions pro forum? Pro-
plaintiff/pro-recovery? Pro-local resident? If so, does the court
provide a rationale for such biases? Reviewing all state cases
individually is a sound beginning to the formulation of a new choice
of law statute for that state. It reflects the sense of the court, which
may well reflect legislative policy.
My proposal for a state-by-state rules-based choice of law
codification based on the state's jurisprudence should lead to
predictability, to just and even-handed results, and to rules that
reflect state interests and policies. Courts will find it easier to apply
a simplified code bound by legislative mandate, and because the
code is founded on judicial reasoning and results, it reflects the
involvement of both the judicial and legislative branches rather than
simply the theoretical constructs of academic scholars. The next
section demonstrates how my proposal might work.
134. Mathias Reimann, Conflict of Laws in Western Europe: A Guide Through
the Jungle 13 (1995).
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id.
[Vol. 65
2004] SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND 27
V. STATE-BASED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
I have chosen to use the state of Wisconsin as my example. In
1965 the state's highest court rejected traditional choice of law
principles in favor of a new analytical standard.'37 Since that time the
Court has at times utilized the Restatement (Second),1 38 interest
analysis,139 grouping of contacts, 4 ° Leflar,14 ' and a combination of
two or more of these modem approaches. To date, Wisconsin seems
to follow Leflar for tort (most of the time) and parts of the
Restatement (Second) for contract (most of the time).142 Though the
Court, as early as 1965, expressed hope that its new approach would
be "practical and workable," 14 3 that has not occurred. Instead, in any
given case, one can predict neither the result nor the methodology the
Court will employ.
One of the earlier studies, conducted by law professor Patrick J.
Borchers, examined some of the Wisconsin tort choice of law
cases. 1" Professor Borchers found that Wisconsin's state courts
demonstrated a strong preference for forum law, for recovery, and for
local parties, but its federal courts did not. 45
137. See Wiegand, supra note 5, at 761. The change occurred in Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1965).
138. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
139. Interest analysis refers to the methodology developed by Brainerd Currie
in the early 1960s. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Law Method, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958); Brainerd Currie, Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duke L.J. 171; Brainerd
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).
140. The grouping of contacts approach does not have clearly delineated
parameters. It generally involves a listing of contacts between the relevant states,
parties, and events, then determining the strength of those contacts in order to arrive
at the state with the most significant contacts. It most closely resembles a
superficial Restatement (Second) analysis. In a number of cases, the line between
a grouping of contacts analysis and Restatement (Second) is blurred. In those
cases, the author considered whether or not the court specifically cited to the
Restatement (Second) and, if so, whether it appeared to apply any portion of the
Restatement. If it did so, the author labeled the analysis Restatement (Second). If
it did not, and if it instead simply listed the contacts and analyzed them, then the
analysis was labeled grouping of contacts.
141. In a number of cases, the court does not refer to Leflar; rather, it refers to
the "choice-influencing considerations" utilized in the Leflar analysis. See Leflar,
supra note 15. At other times it calls these considerations the "Heath factors,"
referring to an early Wisconsin case that adopted this analysis. See, e.g., Diesel
Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 961 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. See Wiegand, supra note 5, for an analysis of Wisconsin's choice of law
history.
143. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Wis. 1965).
144. See Borchers, supra note 104.
145. Id. at 372. His figures are as follows:
forum preference: 8/10 state cases, 5/10 federal cases
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I determined to analyze all available 146 choice of law cases from
the Wisconsin state and federal courts, including tort, contract, and
property issues, and including the federal trial and appellate courts
and all available state decisions since 1965.147 My goal was to
determine if, overall, the cases reflected the bias found in the earlier
study but also, more importantly, to determine whether one might
extrapolate choice of law rules from the courts' decisions, rules that
might form the basis of a state-wide choice of law code.
My search revealed eighty-seven cases, thirty-eight from state
courts and forty-nine from federal courts. 148 They involved thirty-
seven tort issues, forty-one contract issues, four tort/contract mixed
issues, 149 and five miscellaneous issues. Some cases involved more
than one choice of law issue. Most of the contract issues involved
insurance.
As noted above, Wisconsin courts tend to use Leflar for tort and
parts of the Restatement (Second) or a "grouping of contacts" test for
contract issues. 5' The grouping of contacts method, also called the
center of gravity or most significant relationship test, resembles the
Restatement (Second) approach in that it takes into consideration one
or more of the factors listed in the Restatement (Second), either in
section 6 or in the section related to the type of issue (section 145 for
tort, for example), but it does not cite to the Restatement at all and
ignores any Restatement presumptive rule.'51 When Wisconsin
courts apply what they term Restatement (Second), they refer to one
or more Restatement sections, but rarely conduct a thorough
Restatement (Second) analysis. I analyzed each of the cases and
preference for recovery: 8/10 state cases, 6/10 federal cases
preference for local party: 2/2 state cases, 3/5 federal cases
146. By "available" I mean all cases, reported and unreported, available through
an online LEXIS search.
147. I searched LEXIS using the terms "(choice or conflict) w/2 law" and
specified cases from January 1, 1965, to the present.
148. My initial search produced 415 "hits," but many of the cases did not require
courts to make choice of law decisions. It is not surprising that federal cases
outnumber state cases. First of all, choice of law cases often involve out of state
parties, circumstances that are more likely to provide federal diversity jurisdiction
in the federal courts. Second, it is much more likely that federal trial decisions will
be reported rather than state trial decisions. Nevertheless, under the requirements
of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938) and Klaxon Co. v.
StentorMfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941), federal courts are obligated
to apply the choice of law methodology of the state in which they sit. Thus the
results should conform with results in state courts.
149. These are cases in which the court found both tort and contract aspects in
the issue and did not clearly determine which was dominant.
150. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis.
2002); Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Employers Ins., 551 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996); Urhammer v. Olsen, 159 N.W.2d 688 (Wis. 1968).
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categorized the actual methodology used (regardless of what the
court called it). The methodologies fall into one of the following,
with the number of decisions employing such methodologies in
parentheses: '
Grouping of contacts, center of gravity, most significant
relationship (35)
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations (39)
Restatement (Second) (21)
Officious intermeddling 153 (6)
Miscellaneous cases in which the methodology is uncertain (4)
My first inquiry had to do with bias in choice of law
methodology. My analysis revealed the following:
1. Forum Preference
All but the federal appellate court reflected a strong forum
preference. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied forum law
sixty-four percent of the time. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
applied it seventy percent of the time and the two federal district
courts seventy-three percent of the time. The state's courts have
frequently articulated a forum law presumption, though at times it is
merely a "weak presumption," 154 at other times a strong
presumption, 55 and at times it has rejected forum preference
altogether.'5 6 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided only
eight choice of law cases during this period and applied forum law in
three of them (thirty-eight percent).
I next determined whether the courts' methodology affected the
preference for forum law. As noted, choice of law decisions by the
152. A number of cases were subjected to two or more methodologies,
sometimes because they involved two or more separate issues, but often because
the court used one methodology first, and then another methodology as its total
analysis.
153. This is a unique creation. See Wiegand, supra note 5, at 790-93. The
phrase refers to a constitutional hurdle. In Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 204
N.W.2d 897 (1973), the court noted that it should apply choice of law analysis only
if "the facts on their face reveal that to apply any of multiple choices of law would
not constitute mere officious intermeddling, in the constitutional sense.. . ." Id.
at 902.
154. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 156 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Wis.
1968).
155. See Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579,582 (Wis. 1968). See also Sharp
v. Case Corp., 573 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 595 N.W.2d 380 (Wis.
1999).
156. "[W]hile it may be difficult to dispel innate parochial preference, the




Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals do not indicate a strong forum
preference. In the four cases in which it employed Wisconsin's
"grouping" or "significant relationship" test, this court applied forum
law only once (twenty-five percent). However, when a Wisconsin
state or federal district court employed this methodology, it applied
forum law in seventy-one percent of the cases (twenty-two out of
thirty-one cases). Since 1990, Wisconsin state and federal district
courts applied forum law in every case in which they employed the
"grouping" or "significant relationship" method, a total of thirteen
cases. One should also note, however, that most of the thirty-one
cases involved contract rather than tort issues (only six tort issues
were subject to this methodology and all occurred in the 1960s during
a period of transition and evolution in conflict of law theory), and
over half of the contract issues involved insurance contracts, many of
them for automobile insurance. When an insurance policy is issued
in the state to cover a vehicle garaged in the state, Wisconsin courts
are virtually certain to apply Wisconsin law, not unlike the courts of
other states. In fact, Restatement (Second) section 193 recommends
this result."5 8 Thus it is safe to say that since 1970, Wisconsin courts
have applied the grouping of contacts or significant relationship test
to contract rather than tort issues, and have generally applied forum
law.
As for tort issues, Wisconsin courts routinely apply Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, either alone or combined with
some other method. The choice-influencing considerations, with
their focus on the forum's governmental interest and application of
157. Since 1990, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided only two choice of
law cases, Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 677 N.W.2d 298 (Wis. 2004) and
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 2002). The first
case involved a tort issue. The Court applied Leflar. Beloit Liquidating Trust, 677
N.W.2d 298. The second case involved both tort and contract choice of law issues.
The Court applied Leflar to the tort issue and "most significant contacts" to the
contract issue. State Farm, 641 N.W.2d 662. Since 1990 both the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals and the federal district courts have applied the "grouping" methodology
to six cases and in all of them applied forum law. See Bradley Corp. v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito
America, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Glaeske v. Shaw, 661 N.W.2d
420 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Employers Ins., 551
N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Berington v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 552
N.W.2d 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 486
N.W.2d 537 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
158. "The validity of a contract of... casualty insurance and the rights created
thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties understood
was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy,
unless ... some other state has a more significant relationship .... Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 193. "So, in the case of an automobile liability
policy, the parties will usually know beforehand where the automobile will be
garaged at least during most of the period in question." Id. cmt. b.
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the "better law," make no mention of consideration of other states'
governmental interests and thus tend to favor forum law. That is
certainly the case in Wisconsin. When the state and federal courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, 159 applied Leflar methodology, 16° either
to tort or contract cases, they favored forum law seventy-six percent
of the time (thirty-one of forty-one cases). Since 1990, the courts
have applied forum law sixty-eight percent of the time (thirteen of
nineteen cases).
Application of the Restatement (Second) led to different results.
When the Restatement (Second) was utilized either as the sole
method of analysis or combined with another method, Wisconsin
state and federal courts, including the Seventh Circuit, applied forum
law only forty-eight percent of the time (ten of twenty-one cases).
The Seventh Circuit employed it in five cases and applied forum law
in only one of them."' Thus, excluding the Seventh Circuit,
Wisconsin state and federal courts applying the Restatement (Second)
favored forum law fifty-six percent of the time (nine of sixteen
cases), still a lower rate than when utilizing other methods of
analysis. Cases decided in 1990 or later (a total of eight) did not
yield significantly different results. Excluding the Seventh Circuit,
in which all three cases held in favor of non-forum law, courts
favored forum law sixty percent of the time (three of five instances).
2. Pro-Recovery
In addition to concerns about modem methodologies favoring
forum law, earlier studies indicated that modem methodologies favor
plaintiffs. A review of one state's cases disputes this assertion.
Since 1965, choice of law decisions by Wisconsin state and
federal courts favored the plaintiff only forty-seven percent of the
time. 162 The Wisconsin Supreme Court was the most pro-recovery
159. The Seventh Circuit applied the Leflar analysis in three cases and applied
forum law in two of them. See Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th
Cir. 1997) (forum law); Diesel Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 961 F.2d 635 (7th
Cir. 1992) (non-forum law); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985)
(forum law).
160. At times they combined Leflar methodology with other methodologies.
161. See Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.
1997) (non-forum law); Hystro Prods., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384 (7th Cir.
1994) (non-forum law); Diesel Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 961 F.2d 635 (7th
Cir. 1991) (combined with Leflar analysis, non-forum law); Paulson v. Shapiro, 490
F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1973) (non-forum law); Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111 (7th Cir.
1967) (relying on an earlier Wisconsin state case that itself relied upon Draft No.
9 of the Restatement (Second), forum law).
162. Decisions favored plaintiffs in thirty-seven of the seventy-eight cases. In
eight cases, the court's decision was unrelated to plaintiff recovery.
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court with its decisions favoring plaintiffs seventy-one percent of the
time. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals was the least pro-recovery,
favoring plaintiffs only twenty-four percent of the time.
The Leflar methodology was the most likely to lead to pro-
recovery results. Fifty-nine percent of those cases went to the
plaintiff, although this figure changes significantly when one omits
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decisions in which it favored
recovery eighty-three percent of the time that it utilized Leflar
Without the Supreme Court's decisions, the Leflar methodology
favored recovery only forty-eight percent of the time.
Grouping of contacts analysis led to pro-recovery results in only
thirty-four percent of the cases, while analysis utilizing Restatement
(Second) favored plaintiffs thirty-seven percent of the time. Thus,
other than the decisions of a strong pro-recovery state supreme court,
none of the modem methodologies favor plaintiffs. This is
surprising, given that plaintiffs choose the forum. In the future, they
might be better off opting for another state's courts and thereby
benefiting from that state's choice of law methodology.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has been blatant in its preference
for recovery in tort cases, even though other courts in that state seem
to have disregarded this preference. As early as 1965, the Court
noted, "It is the policy of our law to provide compensation to a
person when he has been negligently injured."1 63 For this reason, the
Court disfavored guest statutes. "[1It is the policy of this state to
compensate guests for injuries sustained as the result of the ordinary
negligence of their hosts."' It disfavored interspousal immunity for
the same reason, 165 and this generosity extends not only to Wisconsin
residents, but also to those from other states.' 66 Because the Court
has applied Leflar analysis in most of its cases and that analysis
implicates only five "choice-influencing considerations," one of
which is advancement of the forum's governmental interests, the
forum's interest in recovery will necessarily be advanced.
One might question whether more recent cases reflect different
recovery trends. The state's highest Court has decided only two
choice-of-law cases since 1990, and in the first it reaffirmed the
state's "strong interest in compensating its residents who are victims
of torts" and applied Wisconsin's pro-recovery law. 167 But in the
second case, in a suit by corporate creditors against the officers and
163. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 415 (Wis. 1965).
164. Id. at 417.
165. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 156 N.W.2d 466, 472-73 (Wis.
1968).
166. Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Wis. 1967).




directors of a company whose principal place of business was
Wisconsin, the Court found for the defendants under Wisconsin law,
thus denying recovery but favoring forum law.168 In all other
Wisconsin state and federal cases from 1990 on, courts have held in
favor of recovery only forty-five percent of the time, a percentage in
line with cases decided earlier.
3. Pro-Local Party
Earlier studies indicated that modem odologies favor local
residents. This was not the case in Wisconsin state and federal
courts. Excluding those cases in which both parties were local or in
which neither party was local, the courts favored local parties nearly
half of the time (twenty-seven out of fifty-five cases). Methodology
did not seem to matter.
4. Officious Intermeddling
One final unique Wisconsin choice of law approach must be
reviewed. "Officious intermeddling" was first introduced in a 1973
case .. in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that it could
eliminate from choice of law analysis the law of any state whose
application would "constitute mere officious intermeddling, in the
constitutional sense."1 7° Although it did not elaborate, it presumably
meant that the court could not choose the law of a state when that
choice would result in violation of the due process or equal protection
clauses, an assertion more fully developed in well-established United
States Supreme Court cases.1d-
Since that time courts in the state have utilized this device six
times to resolve choice of law issues. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
recently relied upon this device to hold in favor of forum law and its
local corporate defendant.'72 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in four
cases held in favor of forum law twice, in favor of recovery only
once, and in favor of a local party not at all. The federal district court
utilized this analysis only once, favoring neither forum law nor
recovery. In that case, neither party was local. Thus, based on an
168. See Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 677 N.W.2d 298 (Wis. 2004).
169. Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 204 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1973).
170. Id. at 902.
171. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338 (1930);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). For a general discussion of
Wisconsin's "officious intermeddling" approach, see Wiegand, supra note 5, at
789-94.
172. Beloit Liquidating Trust, 677 N.W.2d 298.
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admittedly small number of cases, the officious intermeddling
analysis does not appear to favor forum law, recovery, or local
parties.
5. Research Conclusions
Based on this eighty-seven case analysis, what can we conclude
about choice of law methodology in this one state? First and most
obviously, the results in this state confirm earlier findings that most
modem choice of law methodologies are pro-forum, but that the
Restatement (Second) approach is less so. The results refute the
assertion that modem methodologies favor recovery and local
parties. It is true that the state's highest court demonstrated a pro-
recovery bias when it utilized Leflar, but neither the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals nor the federal courts reflected this bias. And none
of the state or federal courts demonstrated a bias for local parties.
Before any state undertakes an attempt to draft choice of law
legislation, it would be helpful to know whether its judicial decisions
incorporate a bias so that the state can determine if it wishes to
retain such a bias in its work.
For example, it may be that the body in charge of drafting
proposed legislation in Wisconsin determines that the new code
should incorporate the Wisconsin Supreme Court's policy in favor
of recovery for tort victims. Or perhaps the code should reflect a
preference for forum law. Although some may deride forum
preference as parochial and self-interested, it can certainly be argued
that forum preference is not in itself necessarily bad. Plaintiffs
choose the forum, and in a multistate case, they generally have more
than one option. They would be foolish to choose a forum whose
law is biased in favor of the defendant. As Professor Weinberg
notes,
[t]oday's comity theorists, in a very old tradition indeed,
propose "neutral" rules of choice, applied uniformly by all
states, and independent of the policy of any one state....
The trouble with forum law, from the comity theorists'
perspective, is that it is not neutral; it is law at the plaintiffs
option. But by the same measure, foreign law is not neutral
either. ... In Schultz, for example, foreign law meant what
it usually does: a win for the defendant. Indeed, defendant
bias in choice of law will tend to impact more seriously on
litigation than plaintiff bias will. When a plaintiff wins on
a conflicts point, the likely consequence is only that the
plaintiff will be allowed to try to prove its case under local
law. But when a defendant wins on a conflicts point, the
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likely consequence is dismissal or a nonsuit or judgment for
the defendant. 17 3
The drafters of any proposed state choice of law code must consider
carefully not only the state's jurisprudential history of forum
preference (if it exists) but also the arguments both for and against
such a built-in preference.
No matter what they decide, they will make their determination
in light of informed review of prior cases and will subject their
substantive choices to legislative review. In other words, both the
judicial and legislative branches will have played a role in the new
framework.
Another conclusion one can draw from this analysis is that
sometimes the type of modem methodology makes a difference, but
usually it does not. For example, in Wisconsin, except for the
Second Restatement's disinclination to favor forum law, the
methodology seems to have little effect on substantive results. Thus
it may not matter so much which analysis is used, so long as one is
able to predict with some accuracy which state's law the court is
likely to apply.
If the type of analysis is irrelevant, it makes sense to adopt the
simplest methodology in the interest of simplifying the judicial task
and saving attorneys time and other transaction costs. Furthermore,
with the body of choice of law cases available in each state, it is not
too difficult a matter to ferret out a substantial number of substantive
choice of law rules for the majority of cases and leave only the rest
subject to a simple choice of law analysis.
VI. PATTERN-BASED CHOICE OF LAW RULES
To demonstrate this point, we can return to our earlier example.
Wisconsin courts have decided at least eighty-seven choice of law
cases since traditional rules were rejected. Carefully reviewing each
of them reveals some patterns that may be instructive to those
entrusted with the task of drafting state legislation.
For example, in Wisconsin state courts alone, eleven Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals cases involved automobile insurance
issues."' Consideration of what the courts have actually done in
173. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 Geo. L.J. 53, 64 (1991).
174. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis.
2002); Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Cas. Co., 255 N.W.2d 903 (Wis. 1977);
Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 177 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1970); Urhammer v. Olson,
159 N.W.2d 688 (Wis. 1968); Peterson v. Warren, 143 N.W.2d 560 (Wis. 1966);
American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 486 N.W.2d 537 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992);
Schlussler v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 756 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990);
Belland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 611 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); American
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these cases might lead to a rule that has received judicial deliberation
and will as well be subject to legislative scrutiny as part of the
statutory approval process. Such a choice of law rule might read:
The validity of an automobile insurance liability contract and
the rights created thereby are determined by the local law of
the state in which the automobile will be garaged at least
during most of the term of the insurance policy. 5
This rule reflects the decision in nine of the ten cases considered. In
the tenth case,17 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to apply
Minnesota law to an insurance policy issued to a Minnesota resident.
However, in that case the resident was employed in Wisconsin, lived
directly across the border from Wisconsin, purchased the insurance
in Wisconsin from a Wisconsin insurance company, and paid the
premium in Wisconsin. Furthermore, the Court noted that Minnesota
had since invalidated the law at issue so that its law at the time of
decision was the same as Wisconsin's. 77 Adopting my proposed
choice of law rule would not appear to offend the Court's prevailing
notion of justice.
Another area in which the legislature might adopt a choice of law
rule (or, rather, a choice of law clarification) based on the court's
jurisprudence involves the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law
(WFDL),17 8 an issue that has raised choice of law questions in federal
district court at least five times17 9 and twice in the Seventh Circuit
Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 369 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Martin v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 N.W.2d 847 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Pitts v.
Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
In fashioning rules drawn from state decisions, one might consider
decisions only of state courts. The role of a federal court in determining choice of
law issues is to apply the state's choice of law rules, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313
U.S. 487,496, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 1021 (1941), and to reach a decision based on what
it believes the state courts would do. See also Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591,
594 (7th Cir. 1985) ('The district court correctly stated and applied Wisconsin's
choice-influencing considerations to resolve this conflict"). In drafting choice of
law legislation, I believe it preferable to consider only what the state courts have
done, provided there are sufficient numbers of state decisions from which to draw
conclusions.
175. This language has been adopted from similar language in Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 193.
176. Haines, 177 N.W.2d at 328.
177. Id. at 332-33.
178. Wis. Stat. ch. 135 (2002).
179. See Praefke Auto Elec. & Battery Co. v. Tecumseh Products Co., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 899 (E.D. Wis. 2000), rev'd, 255 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2001); Generac Corp.
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20855 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd, 172
F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1999); CSS-Wisconsin Office v. Houston Satellite Sys., Inc., 779
F.Supp. 979 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Brosahd of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Dion Corp., 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19992 (E.D. Wis. 1990); Process Accessories Co. v. Balston,
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Court of Appeals.1 ° In 1999, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that, when determining whether or not the WFDL applies, it is
unnecessary to engage in a choice of law analysis because the statute
itself contains a choice of law provision.18' The WFDL provides that
"[n]o grantor [of a dealership] . .. may terminate, cancel, fail to
renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a
dealership agreement without good cause" and that the "burden of
proving good cause is on the grantor."' 82 Although the definition of
"dealership" draws no geographical boundaries, "dealer" is defined
as "a person who is a grantee of a dealership situated in this state.
' 183
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, the WFDL applies to all those
dealerships located within Wisconsin's borders but not to dealerships
outside of those borders.'8' Both the Seventh Circuit and two federal
district courts had previously engaged in choice of law analysis in
WFDL cases, finding or assuming that the statute itself did not
contain a choice of law provision." One district court did so even
after the Seventh Circuit's definitive holding.'86 A choice of law rule
.that clearly states the geographical boundaries of the WFDL would
cement the Seventh Circuit's holding, adding clarification to an
arguably ambiguous statute. Obviously, if the legislature determines
that its statutory language has been misinterpreted, it may reject the
proposed rule.
Wrongful death statutes present another area in which a choice of
law rule would be helpful. Here, Wisconsin federal courts have
Inc., 636 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Wis. 1986). This issue has not received choice of law
analysis in the state courts. Because federal courts have been left to guess at what
state courts would do under the mandate of Erie and Klaxon, this area is well suited
to a choice of law rule.
180. Generac Corp. v. Caterpillar Inc., 172 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1999); Diesel
Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 961 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the WFDL in Bush v. National School Studios, 407 N.W.2d
883 (Wis. 1987), but that case focused primarily on whether or not the parties'
contractual choice of law provision would be given effect. Once the Court
determined that it would not, it applied the WFDL because the defendant effectively
conceded that the WFDL would govern if the contractual choice of law provision
did not apply. Bush, 407 N.W.2d at 888.
181. See Generac, 172 F.3d at 971.
182. Wis. Stat. § 135.03 (2002).
183. Id. § 135.02 (emphasis added).
184. See Generac, 172 F.3d at 976.
185. See Diesel Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int'l Corp., 961 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992);
Generac Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20855 (W.D. Wis. 1996);
CSS-Wisconsin Office v. Houston Satellite Sys., Inc., 779 F.Supp. 979 (E.D. Wis.
1991); Brosahd of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Dion Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19992
(E.D. Wis. 1990); Process Accessories Co. v. Balston, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 448 (E.D.
Wis. 1986).
186. See Praefke Auto Elec. & Battery Co. v. Tecumseh Products Co., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 899 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
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fashioned their own unique approach. In some respects, the state's
wrongful death statute resembles the WFDL in that it arguably
contains a choice of law rule:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such
as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action.., then and in every such case
the person who would have been liable, if death had not
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages
notwithstanding the death of the person injured; provided,
that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this
state. 1
87
As far back as 1968, one court noted: "Wisconsin does not apply its
wrongful death statute ... to a death caused outside of the state of
Wisconsin. Thus, there really is no conflict of laws question here,
and it is unnecessary for the court to consider the recent choice-of-
law rules of the Wisconsin supreme court [sic].' ' 88 That has not
deterred other courts from applying a choice of law analysis to
determine whether the state's wrongful death statute applies. In
Wisconsin's federal courts, wrongful death actions have arisen at
least five times since the 1968 decision. Specific issues include the
amount of damages in wrongful death actions 189 and statutes of
limitation for such actions."9
These courts generally employ a combination of center of gravity
analysis and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations 9 with
emphasis on the latter, but one court recently (and curiously) applied
Illinois' Restatement (Second) approach to a Wisconsin case, because
"Illinois and Wisconsin choice-of-law judicial decisions 'seem
187. Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (2002) (emphasis added).
188. Shaver v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 284 F. Supp. 701, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1968); see
also Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1972).
189. See Boomsma v. Star Transport, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Wis.
2002); Snow v. Continental Products Corp., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968). In each case,
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute limited damages more than the law of the other
involved state. Currently, Wisconsin's law permits damages for pecuniary injury
and for miscellaneous expenses, with "[a]dditional damages not to exceed $500,000
per occurrence in the case of a deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the
case of a deceased adult, for loss of society and companionship .. " Wis. Stat. §
895.04(4), (5) (2002).
190. See Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 580 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd 756
F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985). Wisconsin's three-year personal injury statute of
limitations applies specifically to wrongful death actions. See Wis. Stat. § 893.54(2)
(2002).




roughly in accord'..,92 The result in all five cases favored forum
law.
A clear wrongful death choice of law rule would address the
ambiguity in this area. The new rule might mandate that Wisconsin's
wrongful death statute applies to any death caused in the state and
might include the following elaboration: "It is immaterial where the
death occurred, so long as it resulted from a wrongful act, neglect or
default in this state .... The test is ... whether the defendant's
negligence in this state was a substantial factor in contributing to the
result."' 93 This definition, incorporating a holding from the state's
highest court and language from the statute itself, reflects the will of
both the judicial and legislative branches and is thus preferable to a
rule created from whole cloth by legal academics or other experts in
the field.
Medical malpractice is another area in which a choice of law rule
would be helpful. Conflicts scholar, Professor Symeon Symeonides,
states that "[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, most conflicts
cases involving medical malpractice claims apply the law of the state
in which the medical services were rendered."' 94 He cited one
judge's reasoning: "Health care providers should not be put in the
position of having to differentiate on the basis of the patients'
domicile, while 'patients are inherently on notice that journeying to
new jurisdictions may expose them to [unfavorable] rules."""
A medical malpractice rule would have been helpful in the recent
case of Stupak v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.196 In that case, a Michigan
teenager committed suicide after taking medication prescribed by a
Wisconsin physician at a Wisconsin clinic. His parents alleged that
the drug contributed to his death. Although the court applied a forum
preference rule along with Leflar' s choice-influencing considerations
to determine that Wisconsin law applied, the court could have
dispensed with that analysis under a choice of law rule. The court
recognized the wisdom of applying the law of the state in which the
negligent act occurred: the physician "is licensed by, and practices
in" the state, he "examined and treated" the teenager in the state, and
the state "has a strong interest in medical malpractice claims filed
against [its] doctors."'197 Wisconsin's legislature intended its medical
192. Boomsma, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 873 n.1 (quoting language from one of the
parties).
193. Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1972) (quoting
Kinsman v. Panek, 162 N.W.2d 27 (Wis. 1968)). I added the phrase "in this state."
194. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 33.
195. Id. (quoting Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Williams, J., concurring)).
196. 287 F. Supp. 2d 968 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
197. Id. at 969-71.
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malpractice statute "to be applied to Wisconsin health care
providers."1 98 Applying Wisconsin law is in accord with the parties'
expectations as well, since the teenager sought medical treatment in
the state. Both he and his parents, as well as the physician, would
have expected Wisconsin law to apply. A choice of law rule that
applies the law of the state in which the medical services were
rendered simply affirms this reasoning.
Slip and fall cases present yet another opportunity for a clear rule:
apply the law of the state in which the fall occurred. In both Burns
v. Geres'99 and Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co.2°° a Wisconsin resident
traveled outside state borders and was injured when he slipped and
fell while there.20' In both cases, the court applied the law of the
situs, because the court determined that applying Wisconsin law
would "constitute officious intermeddling."2  The reasoning is clear;
"[t]he duty of a property owner to maintain his property should not
vary with the residence of the person who enters the [property]," and
to "apply Wisconsin law would be an attempt to say that Wisconsin
has some legitimate interest in regulating property in [another
state]."2°3 Thus a choice of law rule stating that the law of the situs
governs in such cases makes sense.
In fact, the situs rule can be adopted in other instances as well.
It has a long-standing history; in determining the question of interest
in real property, the law of the situs has withstood all modern choice
of law methodologies. "[I]t is a firmly established principle that
questions involving interests in immovables are governed by the law
of the situs.' '2' Extending this principle not only to slip and fall
cases but to other real property cases not only makes sense, but it also
supports the court's prior rulings.
Wisconsin has already taken a significant step by statutorily
adopting the situs rule for construction contracts. For "contracts for
the improvement of land in this state," Wisconsin statute section
779.135 voids any contract provision "making the contract subject to
the laws of another state ... ,205 Thus, in McCloud Construction,
Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,2°6 the court found void a contractual
choice of law provision specifying that Home Depot's domicile law
198. Id. (quoting from defendant's brief).
199. 409 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
200. 486 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
201. Bums, 409 N.W.2d at 428; Johnson, 486 N.W.2d 37.
202. Bums, 409 N.W.2d at 430; Johnson, 486 N.W.2d at 37 (identical language
in both cases).
203. Bums, 409 N.W.2d at 430-31.
204. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Property ch. 9, Immovables
Topic 2 (introductory note).
205. Wis. Stat. § 779.135 (2003).
206. 149 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
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applied to a contract for construction on Wisconsin real property. It
cited the statute and stated that Wisconsin law applied because of
important state public policies. The "contract has its most significant
relationship with the state of Wisconsin; this is where the property is
located and the work performed., 207
In two other cases, the court held that Wisconsin law applied to
contracts for the sale of land in the state because "of a state's special
interest in its own land. 2 °8 The court noted that the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws supports this position. It provides:
The validity of a contract for the transfer of an interest in land
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence
of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law
of the state where the land is situated unless ... some other
state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 ....
Thus, a situs rule reflects current practice and prior court decisions.210
Product liability actions pose another opportunity for state choice
of law rules. Commentators have proposed a variety of choice of law
approaches for product liability actions, such as a new Restatement,
model rule, or federal law, and, as we have seen, Louisiana's new
choice of law code includes its own rule21 and Oregon's tort section
of its code will no doubt do the same.212
Four product liability actions in Wisconsin's courts resulted in the
application of Wisconsin law, but only two of them contained choice
of law analysis related to product liability actions.2 13 In Smith v.
207. Id. at 700-01.
208. Wyss v. Albee, 515 N.W.2d 517,524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), rev'don other
grounds, 532 N.W.2d 444 (Wis. 1995) (citing Triple Interest, Inc. v. Motel 6, Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 589, 594 (W.D. Wis. 1976)).
209. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 189 (1971).
210. A situs rule for all cases involving real property is not recommended. At
times the contact with real property may be peripheral, and merely having
something to do with real property is not sufficient to subject an issue to that state's
law. At other times, it may be that more than one situs is involved. For example,
in Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Employers Ins., 551 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996), environmental contamination affected eleven different sites, only three of
them in Wisconsin. Id. In that case, the court relied upon additional factors,
including that the plaintiff first chose Wisconsin as its forum and now argued
against using Wisconsin law, the plaintiff was a Wisconsin corporation, and the
insurance policies in question were "sold, issued and delivered in Wisconsin." Id.
211. See supra text accompanying note 70.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
213. The four are all from the Eastern District of Wisconsin federal court.
Stupak v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 968 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Smith
v. Meadows Mills, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 911 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Tillett v. J.I. Case
Co., 580 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F.
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Meadows Mills, Inc., 214 the court applied Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations to find that Wisconsin law applied. Plaintiff was a
Wisconsin resident who was injured in Wisconsin while employed by
a Wisconsin employer, and his medical care took place in Wisconsin.
The product at issue (an edger saw) was "manufactured in North
Carolina almost two decades before the accident," and the
manufacturer and employer "negotiated an asset purchase agreement,
to which plaintiff was not a party, in North Carolina... years before
the accident." '215 That contract contained a North Carolina choice of
law provision.216
In Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co.,217 the court again opted for
Wisconsin law after applying the choice-influencing considerations.
However, here the plaintiffs were Pennsylvania residents, the injury
occurred there, and the product was purchased there, but the product
was manufactured in Wisconsin. At the time, Pennsylvania
contributory negligence law created a total bar to recovery in contrast
to Wisconsin's comparative negligence law. Wisconsin had also
"effectively abolished assumption of risk as a specific defense....""'
In focusing solely on the last two choice-influencing factors,
advancement of the forum's governmental interests and the better rule
of law, the court had little trouble finding that Wisconsin law should
apply. The state's governmental interests would be best served by
applying the law that "has remained virtually unchanged for forty years
and represents a legislative decision that a plaintiff's own negligence
need not act as a complete bar tq recovery .. ,,22' Furthermore,
Wisconsin's is the better law; despite the fact that "only ten states have
enacted some form of comparative negligence law.... Contributory
negligence has been described as a 'discredited doctrine which
automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who have
contributed to their injuries in any degree, however slight. ''22 1
Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1971). In Stupak, the court first conducted a choice of law
analysis for a medical malpractice claim against a physician and determined that
Wisconsin law applied. Then, because the product liability claim against the drug
manufacturer was "inextricably intertwined" with the medical malpractice claim,
it held that Wisconsin law would also apply to it. Stupak, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 971-
72. The court did not apply choice-of-law analysis to the product liability claim.
Id. In Tillett, the court, in a very brief analysis, determined that Wisconsin's
comparative negligence law would apply because it is "better" than Indiana's
contributory negligence law. Tillett, 580 F. Supp. at 1276.
214. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
215. Id. at 915.
216. Id.
217. 324 F. Supp. at 1089.
218. Id. at 1090.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1091-92.
221. Id. (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S. Ct. 202,
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It is clear that Wisconsin courts have not systematically applied
choice of law analysis to product liability cases. A choice of law rule
might bring predictability to this area as well as eliminate parochial
choices that lead to forum law. Because the courts themselves have
provided little guidance in this area, a new choice of law rule might
be fashioned from whole cloth, without disrespecting the state's
jurisprudence.
Suggested alternatives offer a good starting point and a
comparison with one's own state jurisprudence. The Hague
Convention on Products Liability222 provides that the
applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the
place of injury, if that State is also . . . the place of the
habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage, or
... the principal place of business of the person claimed to be
liable, or... the place where the product was acquired by the
person directly suffering damage.223
In addition,
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, the applicable
law shall be the internal law of the State of the habitual
residence of the person directly suffering damage, if that
State is also.., the principal place of business of the person
claimed to be liable, or... the place where the product was
acquired by the person directly suffering damage.224
If neither of these applies, then the applicable law is "the internal law
of the State of the principal place of business of the person claimed
to be liable, unless the claimant bases his claim upon the internal law
of the State of the place of injury. '225 Finally, the law provides that
none of the above apply if the defendant "establishes that he could
not reasonably have foreseen that the product or his own products of
the same type would be made available in that State through
commercial channels. 226
205 (1953)).
222. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 11 I.L.M.
1283 (1972). This Convention has been signed by at least thirteen European states.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table: Convention of 2
October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, at
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/indexen.php?act=conventions.status&cid=84 (Last visited
on Dec. 12, 2004).
223. Id. art. 4, available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index-en.php?
act=conventions.text&cid=84.
224. Id. art. 5.
225. Id. art. 6.
226. Id. art. 7.
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A simpler proposal might be taken from the Swiss Federal
Statute.227 There, the plaintiff has the option of choosing the
law of the State in which the tortfeasor has his place of
business or, in the absence of a place of business, his place of
habitual residence; or [tihe law of the State in which the
product was purchased unless the tortfeasor proves that the
product was marketed in the State without his consent.228
That law also provides that even if foreign law applies under
the statute, "no awards may be made in Switzerland in excess
of those which would have been awarded for such damage
under Swiss law. 229
One might also consult Louisiana's new conflicts law for
guidance. There Louisiana law applies when a resident suffers an
injury in the state or "when the product was manufactured, produced,
or acquired in this state and caused injury either in this state or in
another state to a person domiciled in this state" unless "neither the
product that caused the injury nor any of the defendant's products of
the same type were made available in [Louisiana] through ordinary
commercial channels. 23°
In addition to those statutes already in use, numerous proposals
are also available from academic scholars.23' Some will likely be
found too complicated for use in a statute focusing on simplicity.
Whether any of these rules are reflected in a state's jurisprudence will
determine whether they are most appropriate for legislative adoption,
under my proposal advocating judicial and legislative support for
choice of law rules.
I have examined only a few areas of the law that would benefit
from choice of law rules. Obviously, drafting a new code would
entail many others, and it would, be the drafters' responsibility to
determine the level of specificity for such rules. Would they include
a rule specifically for traffic accidents, or would a rule address torts
more generally? Would individual rules address specific kinds of
227. Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (PIL Statute), in
Switzerland's Private International Law Statute 1987: The Swiss Code on Conflict
of Laws and Related Legislation (Pierre A. Karrer & Karl W. Arnold eds. & trans.,
1989).
228. Id. art. 135.
229. Id.
230. La. Civ. Code art. 3545 (2003).
231. See, e.g., Phaedon John Kozyris, Conflicts Theory for Dummies Apr~s le
Deluge, Where Are We on Producers Liability?, 60 La. L. Rev. 1161, 1176-77
(1999-2000). He urges that his proposal constitute part of a Restatement (Third).
Id. at 1182. See also Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the
Conflict of Laws and the Use oJ That Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 Ohio
St. L.J. 493 (1985).
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contracts, or would contracts be considered generally? Because the
Wisconsin courts have indicated approval of the Restatement
(Second) methodology in the past (though not adhering to it faithfully
or consistently), that methodology could surely provide guidance to
the drafters. Perhaps they would wish to adopt its practice of treating
specific torts and contracts individually and leaving others to be
subsumed by general tort and contract sections. In addition, in the
spirit of drafting rules most helpful to the individual state and most
respectful of its jurisprudence, the drafters could examine the kinds
of issues that seem to occur most often within that particular state and
create rules most appropriate to those issues. The drafters might also
wish to address legal issues that are certain to arise in the future but
have not yet drawn considerable judicial attention, such as internet
issues. In such cases, however, the drafters should be ever cautious
to rely upon the court's jurisprudence to determine how this branch
of government might approach such issues. Analysis of the court's
statements of policies and interests in analogous situations would
serve as a sound guide.
And yet, no set of rules can address every issue that might arise
and anticipate all possible circumstances. "Every rule system that
has ever been proposed or used as a basis for choice-of-law decisions
requires the addition of standards to make the rule system
determinate in a nonarbitrary way." '232 As we have seen, one of the
reasons that the First Restatement both succeeded and failed is that
a number of "escape devices" emerged to avoid unfair or unpopular
results.233 Without such devices, rigid rules offer no escape from the
exceptional case in which nearly all circumstances direct the court to
the law of one jurisdiction though the rules direct it to another. On
the other hand, the "escape devices" employed to avoid the First
Restatement's rigidity also led to its demise in most states. The
frequent need for such escapes demonstrated the scant attention the
rules gave to any considerations other than territorial boundaries.
The rules as applied often failed to consider competing states'
policies and interests, as well as the parties' domiciles and other
significant relationships. The rules-based code that I propose is
based on years of judicial experience with real cases and on judicial
232. Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1989).
233. The most notable of these is the public policy exception, clearly illustrated
in Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986), in which the West Virginia
court reaffirmed its adherence to the First Restatement while applying its own law
instead of the law of the place of injury because of its strong state public policy.
Id. Other devices employed to avoid the rigidity of the traditional rules include
recharacterization of the issue, e.g., labeling it a tort rather than a contract; treating




reasoning, and would thereby incorporate other considerations and
policies. Rarely should a court find the applicable rule unworkable.
When it does, however, the code itself should provide written
standards to cabin wide-ranging judicial discretion.
The drafting of such standards must be an integral part of the
drafting process, and there are certainly a variety of standards from
which to choose, ranging from the most significant relationship
standard to that of comparative impairment or "better law." No
matter which standard is chosen, it should strive for simplicity and
ease of application and be bound by sound guidelines. Furthermore,
the code must make it clear that fallback standards do not displace
the applicable rule unless there are exceptional circumstances under
which application of the rule would lead to shocking or clearly unfair
results. The rules must be more than presumptions, because the
Second Restatement's history demonstrates how easily such
presumptions can be overcome, rendering them meaningless.
Requiring courts to explain clearly why the rules are inapplicable in
any particular case and why the case is truly exceptional ensures that
the rules will not easily be ignored.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I offer a new approach to choice of law analysis,
one that can be described as a true "restatement" of law. It advocates
a state-by-state approach rather than either a national or federal
approach, both of which seem unrealistic and neither of which
demonstrate respect for the individual state's prior rulings and
rationale. I also propose that the choice of law methodology consist
primarily of rules rather than employing an "approach" to choice of
law. This, I believe, will result in more predictability and uniformity
than has heretofore been seen in this area. The rules to be adopted
should not be created from whole cloth; rather I propose that they be
drawn from the state's own jurisprudence as much as possible. When
this is not entirely possible, the drafters should at least honor the
policies and interests articulated in that state's judicial opinions. The
rules should be subjected to legislative debate. The end product will
then have endured judicial and legislative review and deliberation,
and should thereby reflect the state's policies and interests, as well as
commanding respect among the bench and bar. A final written
product-a new choice of law code-will provide parties and their
attorneys as well as the judiciary with a clear, easily accessible,
simple means of making choice of law determinations early in the
litigation.
I have not attempted to draft new choice of law rules for
Wisconsin or for any other state. In fact, I have examined only some
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of the significant areas of law for which a choice of law statute might
be helpful.
This approach to choice of law will not be easy. It requires
analytical and empirical research based on each state's jurisprudence.
However, the end product will have been time-tested; it will reflect
the policies, interests, and concerns of the judiciary in the area of
choice of law; it will undergo considerable legislative discussion and
debate; and it will bear the stamp of approval of both the judiciary
and legislature. This, it seems to me, is superior to approaches
designed solely by legal academics and superior also to the current
common law approach to this significant area of the law. The end
result will be a true restatement of the state's law.

